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THE RIGHT OF PRIVATE JUDGMENT 
• I ' • 
LEON 0 HYNSON 
The right of private judgment is founded upon a right conception of conscience as 
a source of knowledge; the liberty of conscience as a social or communal guarantee; 
and integral to that guarantee, religious toleration. 
The rationale for private judgment is that every person must have liberty of 
conscience to judge what is God's will for his life. Judgment always involves some 
form of knowledge whether that arises from a moral sense, an affection or feeling, or 
a rule of life proceeding from Scripture and grace-enabled reason. In the Reformation 
tradition, developed particularly by Martin Luther and Melanchthon the concept 
would be crucially related to sola Scriptura and sola fidei. Scripture must be that 
fundament for knowledge and truth. The acquisition of right knowledge is found 
in the Apostolic witness to Jesus the Christ, upon Christ's own teaching, upon the 
Father's gifts and the Holy Spirit's guidance (testimonium intemum Spiritus sanctD. This 
testimony of the Spirit is "a state of conviction not induced by argument but by 
direct perception,'" a position which John Calvin held. 
For the Reformers, sola justification by faith alone was crucial to a good and 
clear conscience. Without "alien righteousness," the divine source of righteous 
covering, the conscience must be confused and distorted. A right relationship with 
God sets the conscience aright with a greater capacity to know right and wrong. A 
good conscience is the fruit of this standing with God. Conscience is, nevertheless, 
an immature faculty. It is possible and necessary that it be instructed and educated. 
Bishop Gore of the Church of England wrote: "Man's first duty is not to follow his 
conscience but to enlighten his conscience." 2 St. Paul deals with this question in 
Romans 14. 
When it comes to natural logic or reason, Calvin, more than Luther, would 
affirm the world as the theater of divine majesty and truth. Man is able through 
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rational exercises to perceive the divine and by common grace he may reach conclusions 
about God's purposes. Compared to divine revelation such "natural revelation" (so, Brunner) 
is relatively minimal. It was not lost in man because of God's precedent (prevenient) grace. 
Luther comparatively would treat reason with suspicion, giving it an unflattering term as 
"the devil's whore" However this must not be taken as Luther's definitive word on the 
subject. Like Barth who argued for the supremacy of the analogia Luther wished to 
accent scriptural revelation. Emil Brunner's well known opposition to Barth's views are 
illustrated in their famous argument "Yes" and "No" to natural revelation. 
Although Luther would develop a strong commitment to private judgment, the 
practical outcomes of that doctrine in liberty and toleration would not be realized for 
many decades except in some rationalists like Sebastien Castellio and to some degree in 
Michael Servetus. More evident in the Pietists, the ideas of toleration in matters of faith 
would await another era. The Enlightenment rationalists would argue for toleration on 
other grounds than Christian norms. 
The Pietists, as Roland Bainton has asserted, built upon the principle of toleration in 
doctrine believing in the love of God in the heart to be as strong or stronger than the ver-
balizations of faith.} No rejection of sound teaching may be inferred from this priority, as 
we may see in Johann Gerhardt, Johann Amdt, or Philip Spener. 
WESLEY AND PRIVATE JUDGMENT 
Wesley like his Reformation forebears held to the principle within the context of 
conscience, liberty of conscience and religious toleration. As in his many writings these 
opinions emerged from the matrix of biblical faith, the primitive church, Puritan sources 
and in the dialogue with the teachings of rationalist contemporaries. 
BIBLICAL SOURCES 
Wesley's insights on conscience emerge from a wide ranging scriptural context. Most 
important are his interpretations of S1. Paul's presentation of the law written on the 
human heart. While the people of God - Israel - have the written law, every person has 
the law of God written on the heart, in graced conscience. Against those who wished to 
define this as an aspect of "natural man," Wesley insisted that the grace of God is at 
work in everyone. Defined as preventing (prevenient) grace or as God's graced gift, the 
"conscience" is capable of making judgments about right or wrong. Found in the 
Christian spectrum of doctrine from Augustine <369-430> AD. through the 39 Articles 
of Religion (1648) to Wesley, prevenience means that God always acts gracefully to us 
before any offering we may make to Him. Yon Hugel wrote: "God always precedes us." 
I have argued elsewhere4 that Wesley seems to treat prevenience in Christological 
terms, a logical implication from his doctrine of grace. This however requires a Trinitarian 
perspective. Wesley does not drift toward Christocentric or any other form of unitarianism. 
Conscience, a capacity illumined by grace, does not stand apart from rational reflection. 
"There is none of all its faculties which the soul has less in its power than this," Wesley 
writes of conscience.s Like all of God's gifts this faculty may be abused, suppressed, or 
quenched but not easily. Nevertheless, questions of conscience arise requiring the 
enlightenment of Scripture and reason: 
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Many cases of conscience are not to be solved without the utmost exercise of our 
reason. In ... all the duties of common life, God has given us our reason for a guide. 
And it is only by acting up to the dictates of it, by using all the understanding God 
has given us, that we can have a conscience void of offense towards God and 
towards man.6 
Wesley qualifies his emphasis on the "exercise of our reason" by developing a 
conception of spiritual sight or sense. Following john Locke, he believes that our ideas 
are not innate but proceed from "spiritual senses" or a "new class of senses" The natural 
senses cannot discern objects of a spiritual kind. He insists that 
... your reasoning justly ... presupposes true judgments already formed whereon to 
ground your argumentation. And .. .it is certainly necessary that you have senses 
capable of discerning objects of this kind: ... but spiritual senses exercised to discern 
spiritual good and evil.? 
Apart from this sense, which he may call internal sense "you can have no apprehension 
of divine things. 
Wesley echoes Bishop Joseph Butler of Bristol whose Analogy of Religion and Sennons 
were within Wesley's purview. We know that Wesley read the AnalogyB and it is probable 
that he knew Butler's sermon "Upon the Natural Supremacy of Conscience" Here Butler 
calls conscience, the: 
superior principle of reflection ... in every man ... which passes judgment upon him-
self..., pronounces determinately some actions ... to be in themselves just, right and 
good; others to be in themselves evil... without being consulted,. .. magisterially 
exerts itself.... It is by this faculty natural to man, that he is a moral agent.9 
Wesley as we have seen would deny Butler's assertion that this faculty is "natural to 
man" but is in agreement with the supremacy of conscience over understanding, without 
rejecting the value of reason. Conscience is better described as prevenient grace at work. 
FRANCIS HUTCHESON 
Wesley's conception of conscience is developed most fully in his literary dialogue with 
Francis Hutcheson, Professor of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow University, and a teacher of 
Adam Smith. Hutcheson's Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections was 
written in I 728, two years prior to his appointment at Glasgow. 'o Evidently read much 
later by Wesley, the discussion was from the sermon on "Conscience" by Wesley. I I 
In his largely seminal work' 2 Hutcheson's moral theory considered five senses two of 
which have particular relevance. The "public sense" is "our Determination to be pleased 
with the Happiness of others, and to be uneasy at their misery." The "moral sense" by 
which "we perceive Virtue or Vice in ourselves others"'3 is central. 
Hutcheson gave special thought to the moral sense as the avenue of perceiving virtue 
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and vice. While spelling out his concepts of vice and virtue more adequately in his 
Inquiry Concerning Moral Good and Evil (J 725),14 he repeats in the Essay his notion that 
virtue is found in that which evokes pleasure or agreeableness, and vice in displeasure or 
disagreeableness. Actions are virtuous because they please irrespective of advantage. The 
moral sense approves the virtuous and disapproves the vicious on the basis of the pleasure 
or displeasure evoked. But, it is argued, may not the moral sense approve the vicious and 
disapprove virtue? Hutcheson admits that this may be an exceptional condition, contrary to 
the "general Sense of Mankind," and that reason often corrects the "Report of our Senses." 
He indicated that any instances of such confusion or "disorder" of the moral sense would 
be hard to find. l s Clearly, Hutcheson possessed great optimism regarding man. 16 
Hutcheson also discussed the relationship of virtue and God's will. He cited some who 
insisted that for an action to be virtuous it must have been previously known to be 
acceptable to the Deity and performed with a design to please or obey Him. Hutcheson 
took a different view. 
When a Person ... not thinking at present of the DE[TY, or of a Community, or 
System, does a beneficent Action from particular Love, he evidences Goodness of 
Temper The bare Absence of the Idea of a DE[TY, or of Affections to him, can evi-
dence no evil.... 
[t seems probable, that however we must look upon that Temper as exceedingly 
imperfea ... in which Gratitude toward the universal Benefaaor .... Perfection and Goodness, are 
not the strongest and most prevalent Affections; yet particular Aaions may be ... virtuous, 
where there is no actual Intention of pleasing the DE[TY, influencing the Agent. 17 
Wesley responded to Hutcheson's ideas in his own sermon on conscience. He included 
the public and moral sense in the idea of conscience. 18 Acknowledging that Hutcheson was 
correct in asserting that man is uneasy when he has done a cruel deed and pleased with a 
generous action, Wesley would not allow that the "moral sense" or conscience is 
now natural to man. Rather, he insisted that it is in fallen man the gift of God called 
preventing grace. As Wesley interpreted Hutcheson, the philosopher had excluded 
God from religion, giving Him no place in his idea of virtue; thus Hutcheson's system 
was atheistic. Wesley further believed Hutcheson taught that if one performed a virtuous 
action with an eye toward God, who either commanded it or promised to reward it, his 
action was without virtue.19 
Careful analysis of Hutcheson's Essay on the Passions does not provide corroboration of 
Wesley's claims. Hutcheson was not atheistic. He did not exclude God from his scheme 
of virtue, but argued for the virtue of actions even if they are not intentionally done to 
please God. Hutcheson surely perceived the superiority of actions done to please 
God, over those done from lesser motives.20 Yet, he argued that the beneficent action 
performed without specific reference to God is still virtuous. Wesley did correctly 
interpret Hutcheson's view concerning man, perceiving his optimistic anthropology to 
be in contradiction to the Scriptural and historical picture of man. 
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THE PuRITAN INFLUENCE 
The Puritan concern for the sensitive conscience was transmitted to Wesley through 
different writers in the Puritan tradition. His own taproot drove deep into that strata and 
drew of its vitality. He read and admired John Owen and Richard Baxter, and through 
Daniel NeaJ21 became acutely aware of the Puritan struggle for liberty of conscience of 
which Neal wrote so persuasively When Wesley set down his mature thoughts on 
conscience, he turned toward one whom he saw as the epitome of the conscientious life, 
his grandfather, Samuel Annesley. It is not without significance that Wesley's one sys-
tematic treatment of the doctrine of conscience was brought to its conclusion by a 
lengthy extraction from Annesley's book of sermons, The Morning Exercise of Cripple Cate. 
This volume is said to "occupy an important place in the literature on the Puritan theology 
of conscience and the conscience-guided life."22 
The extract from Annesley contains the essence of the introspection recognized in 
other familiar devotional tracts and guides: the discipline encouraged, the solemnity and 
brevity of life reiterated, the imitation of Christ, the faithfulness of the sovereign God. The 
extract was from Annesley's sermon on "Universal Conscientiousness" and contained 
pithy aphorisms that Wesley must have enjoyed, such as, "We have nothing to do but to 
mind our duty," or "Let every action have reference to your whole life and not to a part 
only." If these guides to disciplined life were followed, conscience would not go astray.23 
A SOCIAL SENSE 
Drawing both upon Hutcheson and Annesley, Wesley emphasized a social sense, or 
what Hutcheson called the "public sense." Here Wesley's familiar position comes to the 
fore: ''There is no holiness but social holiness." To Wesley, involvement in contemporary 
affairs was a matter of conscience, and this meant social concern. It was here that 
Wesley's principle that faith expressed itself by love, in acts of love, was worked out. 
Wesley structured his view of conscience as socially-oriented in his analysis of 
Hutcheson's moral sense and Annesley's sermon on conscience. 
Samuel Annesley stressed the etymology of the word conscience, describing it as 
"knowing with another." Wesley mentioned this in passing, choosing not to emphasize 
the etymology.24 However, he did approve, in a qualified sense, Francis Hutcheson's 
notion that man possesses several senses beside the natural sense, the "moral sense" and 
the "public sense:'25 or preventing grace for Wesley.26 The "social conscience" has these 
two senses. The former suffers anguish when one's fellow man faces misery, and is happy 
at his deliverance. The latter affirms benevolence, and condemns cruelty, whether 
performed by one's self or another. "Do not all men, however uneducated or barbarous, 
allow, it is right to do to others as we would have them do to UST 27 Wesley questioned. 
However, he would not carry this interpretation of man as benevolent to the extent that 
Hutcheson carried it, simply because he believed that the fall of man made man capable 
of acts of malice and cruelty. Hutcheson's view of man was much more benign and 
idealistic. Like Shaftesbury, who opposed the orthodox Christian concept of human 
depravity, suggesting that man is naturally inclined toward goodness and beauty,28 
Hutcheson believed that benevolence characterized most men?9 His Essay on the Passions, 
as Wesley seems rightly to understand, indicates that no man is capable of malice or of 
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finding pleasure in another's misery, and that nearly every man is virtuous as long as he 
lives. Wesley insisted that Hutcheson's optimism was unrealistic and untrue.30 Drawing 
upon his usual sources of knowledge, he wrote, 
I know both from Scripture, reason, and experience that his picture of man is not 
drawn from the life. It is not true that no man is capable of malice, or delight in 
giving pain; much less that every man is virtuous, and remains so as long as he 
lives; nor does the Scripture allow that any action is good which is done without 
any design to please God J I 
Goodness exists in any action when it is performed from godly intention, according 
to Wesley. 
Thus Wesley's concept of the "social conscience" is informed by a realistic, Scriptural 
view of man's estrangement from God and man. Conscience makes evident the act or 
thought which should be followed with respect to the neighbor, but man fails to live out 
what he knows. Wesley emphasized that the insanity of war, the selfishness of certain 
contemporary economic practices, the enslavement of noble men, the traffic of hard 
liquor, and an assortment of other practices, clearly and starkly painted the deviations of 
human actions. 
Conscience shows the benevolent act or attitude toward the neighbor, toward all men. 
This makes conscience sociocentric as well as individual in character. Conscience is active 
in creating a knowledge of the moral character of one's relationship to society. It does 
provide sanctions for structuring a right relationship, but it does not create the positive 
power which engenders such a relationship. 
It is a matter of Christian conscience, Wesley argued, to express living faith by love. His 
excerpt from Annesley's sermon, "Universal Conscientiousness," draws this out, teaching 
the imitation of Christ, the absolute pattern, who constantly did good to men. Follow 
Christ in this, and "your conscience will continue right.. .. "32 
In summary, for Wesley, conscience guides us to an understanding of the quality of an 
action or attitude toward the neighbor. Conscience is active, providing a rnoral perspec-
tive to every social action. The pattern of economics, the structure of politics, the bases of 
war, and social dynamics are brought under the purview of conscience. They are thereby 
moralized. Wesley's treatment of social issues is consistently ethical because conscience 
or the moral sense passes judgment upon their rightness or wrongness. The Christian 
conscience does the same thing, in a sharper, more insightful mannerJ3 
LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE AND PRIV ATE JUDGMENT 
In Wesley's views on liberty of conscience we must consider his Puritan heritage. His 
grandfather, Samuel Annesley, father of Susanna, mother of John and Charles, was a 
Puritan pastor. 
John Wesley, his paternal grandfather, was a Puritan who suffered much under the 
oppressive measures known as the Conventicles Acts and The Five Mile Act. These statutes, 
legislated by the Restoration leaders (1660 and after) made it extremely difficult for Puritans 
to maintain a livelihood. John Wesley died of these restrictions in only his thirty-ninth year. 
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Great grandfathers, both named John White played significant roles in Puritan 
opposition to James I and Charles I (1603-1625, and 1625-1649). Charles had 
vowed to "harry them [Puritans] out of the land." John White of Dorchester was one of 
the founders of the Massachusetts Bay Colony (1628). The other White was a lawyer 
who wrote a tract for the Westminster Assembly arguing in a Calvinistic vein that people 
have a right to rise against a repressive monarch, presumably a Charles I, whose execution 
of January 30, 1649, was the culmination of the Roundhead (Puritan) revolt. Puritanism 
reigned in England until the Restoration of Charles II in 1660. Wesley's parents, Samuel 
and Susanna, first drank of the theological vintage of Puritanism, but in their early years 
moved into the Established Church. 
The concepts of liberty of conscience and the right of private judgment may seem to 
be synonymous. In fact, private judgment is an essential expression of liberty. Without the 
latter the former is not possible. Some have argued for a distinction between the two. 
This is the case in the Establishment's concepts of "passive obedience and non-resistance", 
i.e., that one may hold private views but must not give any public form to them or else 
punishment occurs. The Church of England in its Homilies and its hermeneutic on 
Romans 13: 1-7 had made disobedience to a monarch a sin against God. This made liberty 
of conscience a moot point. Liberty of conscience and religious or political coercion are 
polar opposites. 
Wesley wrestled with this problem when he was challenged to cease preaching in 
another's diocese. It was contrary to Anglican canon law. In a classic case Bishop Joseph 
Butler had directed Wesley to leave Bristol. Wesley argued in these instances of resistance 
that "If a dispensation of the gospel is committed to me, no church has power to enjoin 
me to silence. Neither has the state; though it may abuse its power and enact laws 
whereby I suffer for preaching the gospel."34 His refusal was even more passionate in the 
face of opposition by bishops: "they [Methodists] think Episcopal authority cannot reverse 
what is fixed by divine authority." Where parish priests "palm upon their congregations a 
wretched mixture of dead form and maimed morality" it is a matter of conscience to 
preach Christ's gospel to these people. 
He argued further that his ordination by Bishop Potter of Oxford was not to a specific 
parish but as "a Priest of the Church universal" adding that he had "an indeterminate 
commission to preach the word of God in any part of the Church of England."35 If the 
issue were an indifferent, i.e., adiaphara, thing Wesley held that obedience for conscience' 
sake was necessary. 
In the matter of preaching and any work related to the salvation of souls, Wesley 
consistently fought for liberty of conscience in both church and state. He linked liberty 
and private judgment by appeal to natural law. It is "an indefeasible right, it is inseparable 
from humanity."J6 Conscience is the final bar of appeal; every man "must judge for himself, 
because every man must give an account of himself to God."37 
In a historical picture, Wesley recalls the Smithfield fires under "Bloody Mary", the 
persecutions under Elizabeth, james I and Charles II; prosecution in Star Chambers38 and 
the act against Conventicles, or "gathered churches" outside the Anglican church. All of 
these had created suffering to thousands, loss of property in a nation renowned for 
property rights, and mob actions against Methodists and others. Why the oppressive 
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measures? "Because they did not dare to worship God according other men's con-
sciences."'9 In his reference to natural right or natural law, Wesley is employing a familiar 
principle of his times. William Blackstone's Commentaries stated that law signifies a rule of 
action prescribed by a superior which an inferior is to obey. The will of the Creator is 
called the law of nature by Blackstone and is of higher obligation than any other law. 
Human laws which are contrary to this, being instituted by "inferiors," are invalid. Wesley 
developed this same argument in his Thoughts Upon Siavery40 If ten thousand human laws 
support slavery, they stand under the judgments of divine law. 
Richard Hooker had argued cautiously for the right of private judgments unless the 
law of God enjoined the contrary. With some logic he feared the disappearance of "social 
life in the world," if private judgment were not kept in boundaries.4 ! 
Daniel Neal's Puritan analysis claimed: "The protestant non-conformists [Puritans) 
observe with pleasure the right reverend fathers of the church owning the cause of 
religious liberty, that private judgment ought to be formed upon examination, and that 
religion is a free and unforced thing."42 Of whom Neal spoke is not clear. It appears that his 
was more of a plea than a historical description. 
For Wesley the Protestant Reformation rests upon the right of private judgment;<' loss 
of it "destroys the right...on which that whole Reformation stands." Elsewhere Wesley 
would insist on Luther's doctrine that the Reformation is founded upon justification by 
faith (Articulus stantis vel cadentis EcclesiaeJ. This assessment is entirely consistent with 
Wesley's opinions on private judgment. Much of his Church, had forgotten salvation by 
faith. This doctrine was central to his works, and its loss a powerful symptom of the 
Church's malaise. 
In the first annual conference of the Methodists (1744) the question of private 
judgment was raised, considering the dependence of one member upon another's 
judgment. In speculative issues they would follow rational argument, but in matters of 
conscience liberty was determinative. In 1747, this position was reached: 
And this is the grand principle of every man's right to private judgment...on which 
Calvin, Luther, Melanchthon and all the ancient Reformers, both at home and 
abroad, proceeded."" 
In his debates with Richard Challoner, a Roman Catholic, who argued against private 
judgment, Wesley insisted that this right must determine one's choice of religion 4S 
Finally, Wesley employed this doctrine in letters to William Wilberforce and others in 
authority to seek political relief for his Methodist societies. The Act of Toleration (I 689) 
had granted legitimacy to registered chapels, but was not adequate for those who, 
remaining in the Church, were seeking by their societies to promote reform. At last 
Wesley registered his chapels under the Act, but he was never to leave the Church of 
England. Registration of societies and the ordination of men for the American ministry 
were decisive expressions of his claim to liberty of conscience. By the terms of Canon 
Law and Convocation he was a rebel. However, Convocation was prorogued46 during 
his life and a Church thus weakened took no punitive action against him. 
Despite the lack of official Church discipline, the societies were under attack from 
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indifferent or antagonistic officials and mobs. Wesley's appeal to Wilberforce echoes his 
appeal for liberty and accents his belief in religious toleration. 
TOLERATION 
The meaning of tolerance is diverse, ranging from permission of a minority opinion, or 
no opinion in religious matters, to indifference toward any religious ideas. Where dissent 
from an established religion, like the Church of England, is allowed, toleration may be similar 
to the Act of Toleration by which the state gave legality to Dissenters or non-conformists 
such as Quakers or Baptists. However, what the state gives it in some sense controls. Where 
the state approves tax free structures for religious organizations, the prospect of stifling 
political criticism is present. Free speech and assembly may be jeopardized where a church 
or pastor speaks against a law or a judicial edict. In America that is recognized in the Roe 
v. Wade case legitimizing abortion. In the gradual secularization of American society the 
Court in the 20th century takes on more and more cases involving religion. The opinions 
of a few have been imposed on millions of citizens by the "law making" of a judicial 
body. That is not toleration. 
W K. Jordan's classic The Development of Religious Toleration in England defines 
philosophical toleration as the attitude of mind "which has definite and pronounced 
religious opinions, but which is able and willing to concede to other minds the right to 
retain and practice contrary religious beliefs .... "47 While this definition may describe 
Wesley's mind or attitude, Jordan's subsequent opinion that this cannot be attained by an 
"evangelical intelligence" facing souls confronted with everlasting condemnation opposes 
Wesley's view. In a society where there is religious toleration the evangelical intelligence 
functions in a dialogical experience. The evangel has as much freedom to "offer Christ," 
as Wesley put it, as the secularist has to propose his ideas. In America that was provided 
constitutionally by the First Amendment, but experience is teaching that "free exercise" is 
being eroded by some mischievous rulings. 
RELIGIOUS TOLERATION 
What was Wesley's approach to religious toleration? We have seen that everyone must 
have the right of private judgment precisely because everyone must answer to God. On 
that premise God's call in Christ must be faithfully proclaimed. The Christian's persuasion 
is just that; it must not be coercive or manipulative. With good reason we worry about 
the coercive effects of judicial or legislative law which does not rest on reasonable bases, 
let alone its contradictions of divine law. 
Wesley's analysis of religious toleration builds upon the Methodist experience of 
persecution, the Puritan struggle as a background; the doctrinal issue including the 
question of heresy and the adiaphora; and the Roman Catholic relationship to the 
Church and nation. 
As the Methodist societies advanced in England its precarious standing became a special 
problem. The opportunity for reforming societies with the Church (ecclesiolae in ecclesia) 
was suppressed placing legitimate reform efforts outside the pale. Wesley sought repeatedly 
to commend the loyalty of his societies to Church and state. The Church desired to expel 
them as Wesley wrote to Bishop Tomline of Lincoln in June 26, 1790: 
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'For what reasonable end' would your Lordship drive these people out of the 
Church? .. They desire a license to worship God after their own conscience. Your 
Lordship refuses it; and then punishes them for not having a license! So your 
Lordship leaves them only this alternative, 'Leave the Church or starve'! And is 
it a Christian, yea, a Protestant Bishop, that so persecutes; his own flock? I say, 
persecutes; for it is persecution to all intents and purposes ... and your Lordship 
does this under colour of a vile execrable law,'8 not a whit better than that de 
haeretico comburendo.49 So persecution, which is banished out of France is again 
countenanced in England." 
William Blackstone had argued that "oppression of weak consciences on the score of 
religious profession are highly unjustifiable upon every principle of natural reason, civil 
liberty or sound religion." sD However he worried lest "this indulgence" become an 
extreme. Wesley was clearly not a man of "weak conscience." 
It is conceivable that his actions may have "pushed the envelope" That claim at least is 
consistent with Maldwyn Edwards, assessment. When private judgment is raised vis-a-vis 
societal or communal mandates a caution may be raised. 
HERESY 
On the problem of heresy Wesley is somewhat ambiguous. By his "native air" he 
had breathed anxiety about Roman Catholic political and religious powers. However, 
his definition diverges from the standard view of heresy as heterodox doctrine. In its 
early arguments the Christian Church had defined heresy thus. Wesley considered this 
to be a human invention. 
Heresy is not, in all the Bible, taken for 'an error in fundamentals', or in anything 
else; nor schism. ... Therefore, both heresy and schism, in the modem sense of the 
words are sins that the Scripture knows nothing of; but were invented merely to 
deprive mankind of the benefit of private judgment, and liberty of conscience. 51 
In essence Wesley treated heresy and schism as virtually synonymous. An heretic is one 
whose contention about "foolish questions" leads to division in the church. The so-called 
heretics like Montanus or Pelagius were regarded as good men whose crime was their call 
to a holy life, reproving those like Augustine who were "full of pride, passion, 
bittemess,. .. and as foul mouthed to all who contradicted him as George Fox .... "52 (Wesley's 
tolerance was obviously qualifiedl. 
He went so far as to question the condemnation of Michael Servetus an "anti-trinitarian." 
Based on Calvin's own words concerning Servetus, Wesley questioned Servetus' theological 
language but not his view that "the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is 
God." Servetus could not use the words "rinity" or "Person" 53 
The heretic, that is, one who fostered schism in the church must be subject to church 
discipline not execution or some lesser persecution. 
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INDIFFERENT THINGS 
The issue of indifferent things (adiaphora) was a legacy of the Reformation, particularly 
the teachings of Melanchthon. It was set within the stream of Anglican theology by 
Thomas Starkey, chaplain to Henry VIII. Melanchthon distinguished between divine, 
immutable law and human, mutable law. The former was necessary while the latter was 
indifferent. It was written into the preface of the Book of Common Prayer, and discussed by 
John Locke, Richard Hooker, and Daniel Neal. Wesley defined the concept as that which 
is neither morally good nor eviJ.S4 He employed the doctrine to deny any authority by 
church and state to punish over matters of indifference. These things like the wearing of 
sacerdotal vestments were not determined by the Word of God as wrong. They were not 
necessary to salvation. Matters like clerical garments, canon law, or church liturgies, were 
the human expression of adiaphora. Full toleration on these issues was required. 
Obedience to church or state officers was required. 
The third matter to consider is the toleration to be extended to Roman Catholics. 
Wesley believed that the Council of Constance (1215) which had promised safe conduct 
to John Hus (but not from Constance) only to execute him, was expressed in the concept 
"no faith is to be kept with heretics." In this case the heretic was one with whom the 
orthodox disagreed. This was Sebastian CostelliD's c1aim.55 
ON TOLERATION TO CATHOLICS 
Wesley debated Roman Catholics at a number of levels, but turned recurrently to the 
"no faith" argument he attributed to Constance. Wesley argued: "no government ought to 
tolerate men who cannot give any security .. .for their allegiance .... " 
But this no Romanist can do ... while he holds that "no faith can be kept with 
heretics." One who accepted priestly absolution or the spiritual power of the Pope 
could not give such allegiance. The Pope could forgive "rebellions, high treason, and all 
other sins whatsoever" Wesley believed. 56 
In 1778 a Catholic Relief Act allowed Catholic military recruits to take a simple oath 
of allegiance to the Crown. Wesley wrote with displeasure asserting that from Constance 
onward Catholic "intolerant, persecuting principles" would always lead to political disloyalty. 
The Relief Act led Catholics to interpret it as toleration; they began preaching openly, 
establishing seminaries and winning converts. Wesley's belief in the "no faith" principle 
would prevail, even when he would write an irenic "Letter to a Roman Catholic" which 
Cardinal Bea in our century has called "an extraordinary document," an ecumenical 
treatise.57 The essence of this letter shows appeal for brotherly love. "Come my brother, 
and let us reason together.. .. Let the points wherein we differ stand aside: here are 
enough wherein we agree,. .. the ground of every Christian temper and of every Christian 
action, "i.e., love."58 Wesley could find toleration for Catholics and others who might 
disagree on certain doctrines but who experienced a "Catholic Spirit" or a holy love for 
others, especially the Christian family' Where love exists everything else takes its place. 
Without love, every doctrine or practice is insufficient. Original sin, justification by faith, 
the new birth, and holiness of life are essential doctrines which are to be experienced. 
These are "essential" for Wesley; love crowns everything. 
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PRIVATE 'UDGMENT-A CRITIQUE 
When private judgment is contained within the boundaries of the Apostolic witness, 
in the Christian church's balanced interpretations, and the Pietist concem for holy life, 
the concept holds much value. When liberty of conscience is tolerated, not given under 
legal constraints which may be modified by subjective or individualistic whims, the idea 
is very important. Wesley taught that both church and state are to recognize liberty of 
conscience, not by political pressures but as a natural right prevenient grace bestows. 
One of its perennial problems is seen in the lasting pattems of doctrinal variation in 
Protestantism. Roman Catholics are properly troubled by this diversity. [n America this 
diversity is growing in the Roman Catholic Church, doubtless shaped by the subjectivism 
of church and society. Catholics in the larger Roman Catholic body find stability in the 
Pope's universal authority59 The Catholic concem about private judgment was expressed 
by Richard Challoner's words to Wesley. Whether Wesley balanced doctrine and praxis 
may be debated. [ believe he did! However, it is possible to lift his view on heart religion 
out of its context of Christian faith (fiducia). The consequence, seen in much of his 
Methodist family, is to weaken the faith- the Apostolic witness- in favor of a subjectivism 
which allows departure from that witness. In its susceptibility to cultural norms, its doctrinal 
inclusiveness, the inheritors of Wesley have too often accepted the world's non-judgmental 
view of behavior. The principle of Christian discipline so clearly taught by Jesus (Matthew 
18) is missing in the church. Seldom do we possess the will to test the prophets or the 
behavior of those who violate Christian commands. 
Wesley's famous aphorism united "knowledge and vital piety." His sermon "Catholic 
Spirit" borrows Jehu's phrase "If your heart is as my heart, give me your hand" ([[ Kings 
10: 15). This is an irenic invitation changed into doctrinal indifferentism by too many of 
Wesley's inheritors. 
Doctrinal inclusivism offers an easy avenue to cultural and religious opinions. "There 
are many paths to Heaven," (whatever is meant by "Heaven") it is argued. It eases the 
path to ethical subjectivism found in many sectors of society. We will assert the failure of 
"community" in such a moral wildemess. The social order is being gradually weakened. 
Demoralization is in process because the world is losing its cohesive energies. 
When the Court case legalizes abortion; homosexuality as a private exercise; denial of 
the Ten Commandments as a standard for public morality,60 and the '''under God' pledge 
of Allegiance; and more, individualism has run amuck. One person's private opinions, forced 
upon millions who hold to the endless value of: 'no other gods beside me,' describes a 
crumbling social order. If the Decalogue is to be removed, are we to assume that dishonor 
to parents, faithlessness to a spouse, taking wrongfully another's life, stealing another's 
property, longing for another's things or even his/her spouse, or cheating and lying are 
norms; are these to be excised from the 'public square'? What is to hinder the 
Court/courts from treating any or all of these as norms? Unrestricted abortion, sodomy, 
euthanasia, adultery are either legalized or are growing steadily in a disoriented society, a 
world tumed upside down. Sodomy is acceptable because the Court says it is. Legislators 
in too many instances rush to legislate what the Court says is the law."61 
Our great anxiety is that coercion will replace "free expression," that a society suffused 
with Judeo-Christian standards will be undermined by the runaway councils which fashion 
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governing regulations. Unrestrained arbitrariness leads to a cacophany of voices and either 
anarchy or forms of totalitarianism. We are on the way to relative degrees of these patterns 
and there is less and less light on our journey. 
Skeptical agnosticism or radical atheism seek to remove our Judeo-Christian norms 
and even its language (especially its language) in favor of their own religious ideals. Make 
no mistake about the "religious" will which shapes agnosticism, atheism, or subjectivism. 
Secular idolatries, "centers of Value" (Niebuhrl are pervasive. Only the surprising work of 
God in spiritual renewal will tum us from the precipice before us. Like runaway bison in 
the Indian frontier who fell helplessly over the cliffs to their deaths, we run! The church 
still stands as a guardian but it must revive the radical message of Jesus the Christ. Jesus is 
still the hope of the world. He is Lord' 
Teaching the faith is not like peeling a banana or "falling off a log." Scripture offers a 
plain way, but it also contains some things difficult to understand (2 Peter 3: I 5-16). 
Instruction in the faith and guidance into truth are imperative. Knowing the truth cognitively 
but not experientially is insufficient. 62 The reverse is equally true. Jesus said: "You will know 
the truth and the truth will make you free." How will we know? "If you continue in my 
word, you are truly my disciples." (john 8:31) Unless Christian churches- the people, the 
pastors, the theologians-hold the Reformation Protestant principles in balance, they (we) 
risk the radical subjectivism which floods our society. The authority of Scripture (sola 
Scriptural; trusting faith (sola fidej); the inner illumination of the Spirit (testimonium intemum); 
careful hermeneutics within the body (the charisms)-I Corinthians 14:29-33), will create 
peace rather than disorder (14:33). 
This is the enterprise of the Church. By these principles the right of private judgment is 
protected against coercion from within the Church or without. Less division may be 
realized, fewer church splinters founded in personality cliques (Paul, Peter, Apollos-
(I Cor. 3 :3-6, 22) will follow. Those who fear that loss of private judgment would have 
prevented Luther's protests will find, I believe, that his Reformation guidance guards 
against heresy and confusion. 
To Timothy Paul exhorts: "Watch your life and doctrine closely. Persevere in them, 
because if you do, you will save both yourself and your hearers" .... Do not neglect the gift 
[from Greek word charisml that is in you, which was given to you through prophecy with 
the laying on of hands by the Council of elders [presbyters]." I Timothy 4: 16, 14 - NRSV 
We do not think or speak de nova about anything. While we are responsible before 
God for the warrants of conscience, this gift of precedent grace must yield to the claims of 
Scripture, rightly divided. This is where Luther came down: "Unless I am informed by 
Scripture .... " Like Luther, Wesley was a man of Scripture (homo unius libri) "a man of one 
Book." Neither of them would surrender the historic interpretations of theology, language, 
or hymnody. We ought not to tout freedom of conscience as unrelated to these as though 
conscience works best through emotion or ignorance, whether invincible, i.e., willful, or 
vincible. Wesley used the term "invincible" to describe those who would not believe. 
Conscience which is God's gift shares in our mortality requiting instruction in the 
Scriptures in order to know Christian values. This means that faithful believers-pastors, 
teachers, theologians- must lead the way to the truth in Christ Jesus. Finally we are all 
obligated to the guidance of conscience. 
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